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Abstract
This essay briefly discusses the reality that I have experienced in air transport for some time.
In this field, the world is still ruled by bilateral air transport agreements. Such bilateral agreements
are even in force in Europe. This essay asks several questions. First, what does successful dereg-
ulation in Europe really mean? Would deregulation be successful if many low-cost carriers flew
throughout Europe and carried mostly point-to-point traffic from point A to B? I personally think
that very few routes are suitable for this point-to-point traffic.
DEREGULATION OF AIR
TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS
Dr. Robert Wolfger*
Thank you for making it possible for me to take part in this
Symposium. Normally, it means trouble for an airline when it is
surrounded by so many lawyers. It means trouble because for
many airlines, economic considerations, in whatever form, come
first, and then competition law may hit.
I represent a national airline here. Austrian Airlines is fifty-
one percent owned by the Austrian state, a small state. Within
this small state, there is limited competition. On the other
hand, Austrian Airlines is a very small airline with only a two per-
cent market share in Europe. In absolute size, Austrian Airlines
ranks forty-ninth in the world. Austrian Airlines has a limited
number of aircraft, and has shown positive results for a couple of
years now.
Shortly before this meeting, Dr. Romina Polley asked me if I
was offended after reading her presentation. I told her that I
was used to the arguments she used in her Essay. Having been
with Austrian Airlines for almost twenty years, I know about the
past fairly well, and I follow present developments closely. I
started with market research, worked in personnel administra-
tion for some time, and have been with international relations
for fourteen years, which means, in the first instance, care for
government relations. I must admit that we have very good rela-
tions with the Austrian government. I have to admit as well that
when Lauda Air-now our daughter company-was owned by
Lufthansa, Lauda Air had even better relations with the Austrian
government.
Let me talk briefly about the reality that I have experienced
in air transport for some time. In this field, the world is still
ruled by bilateral air transport agreements. Such bilateral agree-
ments are even in force in Europe. For example, there is still a
bilateral agreement between Germany and Austria, which has
not been canceled but has, to a great extent, been overruled by
the three European liberalization packages and the declaration
of applicable competition laws to air transport within the Euro-
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pean Union ("EU"). Not much more than ten years ago, traffic
between Germany and Austria was nearly reciprocally allocated
to Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines by means of a so-called pool
agreement. We sat together every other month in a relaxed at-
mosphere, talked about figures, talked about costs, and how to
allocate the revenues between us. There was an agreement to
share the revenues-in principle, half and half. Of course, Luf-
thansa had much more revenue than we did, as we were a small
airline, and therefore the payments resulting from that pool
agreement flew in our direction. Although the pool payments
had a limitation of one percent of the revenues of the paying
partner, we received about seven million Austrian shillings every
season for conceding that Lufthansa was allowed to offer some
more seats to Austria than we did to Germany. That is over.
That is finally over within the European Economic Area.
It is still the case, however, between the EU and other coun-
tries of the world. Not long ago, I returned from bilateral nego-
tiations with Israel. There is a bilateral agreement between Aus-
tria and Israel, just as one is in effect between Germany and
Israel-an air services agreement of a rather pre-deterministic
type. This agreement stipulates that every airline that is desig-
nated on each side has, on principle, the right to offer fifty per-
cent of the capacity, but only one airline on each side should be
designated for offering this capacity. This agreement also stipu-
lates that both designated airlines must agree on their capacity
to be offered in advance, and if the airlines agree, then the re-
spective governments would give their consent. Within this bilat-
eral agreement, Austrian Airlines transports more passengers
than El Al. Within this environment, adding frequencies be-
tween Austria and Israel is hardly possible. For years, there has
been a pool agreement between El Al and Austrian Airlines.
Even if code sharing is offered, or eventually the pool payment
might be raised, one never takes for granted that the partner will
agree to that capacity increase. That is air traffic under a bilat-
eral agreement, especially one with a predetermination clause.
The same scenario goes for Russia, with the new Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, and still with almost all Central European
countries. It is also the case for most of the air traffic between
Europe and Latin America, and between Europe and Asia. Be-
tween Austria and Tokyo, one cannot offer the capacity accord-
ing to market needs. There is a limitation to the capacity the
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other partner, or the other party, is ready to grant to you. It is a
built-in limitation, as it is not only the one party in Europe that
can liberalize or deregulate. There is also the other party that
has a say in bilateral agreements. If the European Commission
("Commission") obtained an unlimited mandate to negotiate
with these countries, then I fear that from some countries, which
are not as liberal regarding air traffic as in our part of the world,
we would get much less than we have now.
Let me discuss, as an example of an air transport agreement
that had some importance for Austrian Airlines in the past, the
air transport agreement between Austria and Spain. Normally,
the annex to a rather liberal agreement says that the designated
airlines of Spain are allowed to fly from any point in Spain to any
point in Austria, and the designated airlines of Austria are al-
lowed to fly from any point in Austria to any point in Spain. This
air transport agreement, however, was not that liberal. It said
that the designated airlines of Spain could serve any point from
Spain to Vienna, and the designated airlines of Austria could do
so from any point in Austria to Madrid. One can already see
from this formula, however, that the chances are not evenly dis-
tributed because Spain has so many interesting points for an air-
line, while Austria has, at most, only Vienna and Salzburg to of-
fer. Graz, Klagenfurt, and Linz might not have been so attractive
for new air services within these agreements. Even with such an
air transport agreement the points are limited, and in this situa-
tion, they were even more limited. The designated airlines of
Spain flew from two limited points in Spain-Madrid and Barce-
lona-to Vienna, while the Austrian airline was allowed to fly
from points in Austria (the only economically reasonable point
was Vienna) to Madrid. I do not think that this was fair, but it
was, let us say, a reciprocal formula and logically clear: from
points here to one point there-the reciprocal way. So Iberia
was allowed to fly from Madrid to Vienna, from Barcelona to
Vienna, from Malaga to Vienna, from wherever in Spain they
wanted to Vienna, and we were allowed to fly from Vienna to
Madrid, from Graz, Klagenfurt, Linz, and Salzburg to Madrid.
If, under a pre-determinative type of agreement, one finds such
a situation, then the small country normally, through repeated
negotiations, can negotiate more points in the other, larger
country. So, after a while, we were allowed to get Barcelona, to
get Malaga, and even a fourth point. We got a little bit more
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than a logical formula of reciprocity would permit. Now, if one
takes all the European countries, especially the small ones, nego-
tiating in the same way with Spain, they often got more rights
than they deserved out of these reciprocal agreements. I think
this is still the case between smaller countries in Europe and
larger third countries, where the governments still show a rather
restrictive attitude.
This conclusion is even valid if we consider the relations be-
tween single European countries and the United States. Many
European countries have concluded Open Sky agreements with
the United States, which mainly offer every European country
such an Open Sky agreement. I must say that for Austria, this
Open Sky agreement might be the optimum it could get. I sup-
pose that for the German carriers, the Open Sky agreement be-
tween Germany and the United States might also offer the best
available chances. I don't know if the Dutch agreement is suffi-
cient for the Dutch carriers, but for the Spanish and Portuguese
carriers, I also suppose that such an agreement would be
enough. For most of the European carriers, an Open Sky agree-
ment with the United States might be the best they could get.
Why the best? Because most European carriers operate from or
to one single hub, and they try to build up, maintain, or expand
this single hub. The more spokes they add to this hub, the bet-
ter their competitive advantage is, and the cheaper the fare they
can offer to the public. If some spokes are taken out of these
hubs, however, as the Commission thinks they must be in the
case of British Airways/American Airlines and maybe Lufthansa/
SAS/United Airlines, then the cost of the network operation
would naturally go up, and the prices for the public would in-
crease. So, if the European carriers build hubs in their own
countries they need not, in the first instance, build second or
third hubs in other countries if there is no severe capacity con-
straint at their main hub. Lufthansa, in my opinion, need not to
build up a hub in Madrid. Lufthansa need not build a hub in
Rome or in Milan, because, with their hubs in Frankfurt and Mu-
nich, and their cooperation network, they can serve the whole of
Europe. Europe is not the United States, where the situation is
completely different, and carriers possibly need more hubs be-
cause the country is so much larger.
So, cui bono, what happens if the Commission negotiates for
the whole European air traffic-if single countries, in the long
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run, could gain more, vis-i-vis more restrictive countries, and if
the single countries are rather happy with their Open Sky agree-
ments? I doubt that it would bring about an added value for
existing carriers, in case the Commission negotiates.
In general, one could ask, what does successful deregulation
in Europe really mean? Would deregulation be successful if
many low-cost carriers flew throughout Europe and carried
mostly point-to-point traffic from point A to B? I personally
think that very few routes are suitable for this point-to-point traf-
fic. I might offer you an example. Just at the time Austriajoined
the EU, there was a Belgian entrepreneur who wanted to fly with
his low cost airline between Vienna and Brussels, between Brus-
sels and Rome, and between Brussels and Barcelona. He started
this operation between Vienna and Brussels. The airline's name
at that time was Eurobelgium, although now it is Virgin Express,
as the entrepreneur sold the airline to Mr. Richard Branson. At
that time we made the following calculation: Eurobelgium oper-
ated with a 737, and offered a price of DM130 from Vienna to
Brussels one way. No frills were included. The airline, which
offered its services daily, needed a break-even of seventy percent
just to cover its cost. The managers of this airline thought there
was more than enough point-to-point traffic on this route.
There was not enough, however, and there is still not enough. If
airlines operate between two hubs-in the case of Vienna and
Brussels, these airlines have been Sabena and Austrian Airlines
for years-then almost fifty percent of the traffic, or even more,
is hubbing traffic. It is network traffic, not point-to-point traffic.
So, if an airline goes into such a route and wants to have only the
point-to-point traffic, it can only gain a very limited number of
passengers from the incumbent airlines.
After two years of making losses, Mr. Hasson, who was the
owner of that airline, called us. We went to Brussels to have talks
with Mr. Hasson. He told us the following:
Look, I tried, but have not been successful in my way. I offer
you one thing. Give me, let's say, 70 seats from your midday
flights at a price of 80 Deutsche marks. In such a case I will
put these passengers on your planes, they will get no service,
except an apple from time to time, but the passengers will
know, that they are on my no-frills part of the plane, not
yours.
We asked him not to pursue this idea any further, but to use a
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smaller aircraft, as we offer a different standard of service qual-
ity. We want to offer quality service to the passengers on our
planes, and such an idea does not fit our flights. He told us that
he would to have to give up the route and consult another air-
line about the idea of cooperating on his other routes. Finally,
he went to Sabena. Maybe this suited him better because he-
and now Virgin-cooperates with Sabena, though in a slightly
different fashion. Sabena accepted his flights to London, Rome,
and Barcelona under its umbrella, and operates these flights
under its own name.
With this example, I just wanted to mention that even
within Europe, we have mostly network operations. The Com-
mission is investigating purely on the basis of routes. On the
route, the Directorate General IV officials say that if you have
market power, you have market dominance. They argue the
same way when investigating third country routes. When they
examine the U.S.-Austria traffic, they almost solely look at the
New York-Vienna route. A rather limited number of passengers
fly on this route; approximately 120,000 passengers a year. With
this limited demand, we can hardly operate two frequencies a
day. Let us say it is not enough potential to operate two frequen-
cies a day, but we must operate them in order to have connec-
tions from and to the United States via Vienna. So you have to
operate two frequencies, but the load factor does not justify
them if you operate on your own. If we did not have our partner
Delta Airlines cooperating on this route, which contributes sub-
stantially to the route, then we would have to bear losses. The
Commission says, however, that by cooperating you have a domi-
nance on this route, and they have to see if they might have to
take something away here-slots, frequencies, the cooperation
vis-A-vis travel agents, companies, etc. Although the route is
open to competitors, nobody else in Europe is interested in op-
erating this route.
There is a difference, of course, between small airlines and
big airlines. If there is a very big airline on the very west end of
Europe, then this airline could have a dominance, as no passen-
ger would be interested in going eastwards first in order to con-
tinue westwards. In this connection, one must say that the Com-
mission is investigating business traffic, in the first instance, be-
cause the Commission considers this kind of traffic as having no
other choice than going on the direct flight. We made a study
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together with the Roland Berger company, however, and this
study shows that from Austria-or from Germany-to the
United States, this is not true, because only thirty to forty per-
cent of the business traffic goes on the direct flights to the
United States. Seventy percent of the business traffic, at least
from Austria, is going via other European points. Traffic, includ-
ing business traffic, which the Commission considers time-sensi-
tive, to or from the United States, is network traffic. It is not
purely third and fourth freedom route traffic. It is network traf-
fic, and you have to investigate the traffic flows within networks.
This result is also true in case of business traffic.
One last remark, maybe a short one about prices in air
transport. Fifteen years ago, we had real networking in prices.
There were the International Air Transport Association agreed
fares, and there was a world wide network in fares. Small Aus-
trian Airlines had a world wide network offer. What does that
mean? When we sold a ticket from Vienna to Los Angeles-we
did not even fly to New York in those days-any airline accepted
this ticket, any airline. So the passenger had the choice to fly via
Frankfurt, via Paris, via London, via Madrid, wherever he
wanted, because there were agreed tariffs around the world, and
so-called interlining between all airlines was granted. I do not
say this was good in all aspects, because this mechanism in some
cases kept the fares at high levels. But, on the other side-and
let us say, under the table-for travel agents and for big compa-
nies, there existed other, and, in all cases, lower prices. So, for
example, if the official gross tariff to Los Angeles was, let us say,
12,000 shillings, big companies got a rebate, and then the net
rate might have been, for them, let us say, 8000 Shillings. Air-
lines that had on-line connections to Los Angeles-via Frank-
furt, Paris, London, Amsterdam, etc.-could sell at 8000 shil-
lings because they pro-rated this fare internally over their own
flights. If we sold this 8000 shilling fare via our connecting flight
to Amsterdam, then KLM would have taken from us a pro-rated
Amsterdam-Los Angeles fare based on the 12,000 shilling fare,
and this might have been the 8000 shillings in all. Now it is pos-
sible to sell the 8000 shilling fare with our partners, because if we
sell at these 8000 shillings, we are able to keep 4000 shillings for
the New York route, and Delta takes 4000 shillings for the New
York-Los Angeles route. If we did not have these internal agree-
ments, then we could not even interline with our partners. So
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pricing agreements and interlining agreements are good for the
passengers, as well as for the interlining partners, because they
create new products. If, for example, we have a low tariff, now
we can offer this low-tariff together with all our partners, but we
cannot offer this low tariff on Lufthansa, on KLM, or on other
alliances-they have their own low internal tariffs. This result
keeps the alliances apart, and it keeps them apart while, in other
fields, there necessarily remain connections between alliances,
especially if small airlines are concerned. When we could no
longer afford to operate to Dusseldorf-we experienced a loss of
twenty million shillings within one year-then we had to ask Luf-
thansa if they could be so kind as to offer us some seats on its
flights in order continue feeding our hub in Vienna. The other
alternative was to go out of this route. Lufthansa kindly agreed.
We offer our prices there, Lufthansa offers its prices on this
route, and there is competition on this route. With the Commis-
sion, however, we still might have a problem. The Commission
might say that there should be absolutely no cooperation be-
tween alliances, whatever cooperation it might be. This rule can-
not be the case for small airlines, however, because if it were so,
the diversity of route offers would be killed in favor of an over-
simplified theoretical construct.
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